Introduction

Maribel Romero Un iversity of Pennsylvania
Copular sentences of the shape XPJ is XP2 can be divided into at least two types: predicational, where XP2 predicates a property of XP 1, as in (1); and specificational, where XP2 intuitively identifies the value ofXP1, as in (2) .
(1)
The number of planets is large.
PREDICA TIONAL (2) The number of planets is nine.
SPECIFICATIONAL
Specificational sentences show Connectivity Effects (Akmajian 1970 , Higgins 1979 , Halvorsen 1978 , Jacobson 1994 . For example, an NP like no man embedded in a relative clause in general cannot bind a pronoun outside the relative clause, as illustrated in (3a); but in specificational copular sentences this binding is possible, as in (3b). This effect is called Variable Binding Connectivity. Similarly, the NP a unicorn cannot be interpreted de dicto with respect to the embedded verb look fo r in (4a); but a de dicto reading is possible in the specificational sentence (4b) (Opacity Connectivity). Connectivity will be used in this paper as a diagnosis fo r specificational sentences. Specificational sentences further exhibit a tense restriction known as "Tense Harmony " : they cannot at the same time have present tense inside XP I and past tense in matrix be, as schematized in (5) ; see also Akmajian 1970 , Higgins 1979 . Predicational sentences do not observe this restriction. This is illustrated by the contrast in (6)- (7 derives Tense Harmony from the idea that, in the formula corresponding to the entire sentence, the matrix tense operator must bind a tense variable within XP I . For example, in (8a) and its semantic representation (8b), the 31 introduced by matrix PA ST must bind the tense variable 1 in 1X{president(x, t)) . This idea can be implemented in two ways. Strategy I assumes a L ( ogical) F(orm) where matrix PA ST directly binds the temporal variable in XP I and where specificational be (beSPEc) denotes bare identity, as in (9). Strategy II assumes an LF where the temporal variable in XP I is bound within the XP I itself and treats besPEc as (temporally) intensional, as in ( 1 0). As the two strategies lead to the same result in her examples, Sharvit leaves the choice between the two open. 1
The goal of this paper is to argue fo r strategy IT. First, in section 2, I will show that the two strategies must in general be distinguished, since they lead to different empirical results in other constructions. Second, once this distinction is made, section 3 will present data in support of strategy IT over strategy I fo r specificational sentences. To this end, an analysis of know with Concealed Question NPs will be presented in section 3.1 and extended to beSPEC in section 3.2, concluding that beSPEC is an intensional verb. Third and fm ally, section 4 will recast Sharvit' s (2003) analysis of Tense Harmony within strategy IT.
TENSE AND INTENSIONALITY IN SPECIFICATIONAL COPULAR SENTENCES
Temporal dependence vs. (world and temporal) intensionality
On the one hand, building on En9 (1981 En9 ( , 1986 , Musan (1995) argues that NPs with cardinal readings -e.g., bare plurals with an 3-interpretation-have only a temporal dependent reading in German, as the contrast between (1 1) and ( 12)
shows. The same holds fo r Spanish bare plurals, witness (13)-(14). These temporally dependent readings can be captured by requiring an LF where the local tense operator binds a variable inside the bare plural NP, in the spirit of strategy I.
(1 1) Die meisten Professoren waren in den sechziger gliicklich.
The most professors were in the sixties happy 'Most professors were happy in the sixties.' a. Temporally dependent: 'The majority of individuals that were professors in the 60s were happy in the 60s. ' b. Temporally independent: 'The majority of individuals that are professors now were happy in the 60s.'
(12) In den sechziger Jahren waren ja doch Professoren gliicklich.
In the sixties were (indeed) professors happy 'In the sixties, [some] professors were (indeed) happy. ' a. Temporally dependent. b. * Temporally independent. On the other hand, when an NP with a relative clause (RC) functions as the object of an intensional verb like buscar 'look for ' in Spanish, the mood in the RC encodes the scopal relation between the two (see Farkas 1993 , Quer 1998 In 1990 J. was looking-for A a professor that could-SUBJ speak 7 lgs 'In 1990 Juan was looking fo r a professor that could-SUBJ speak 7 lgs. ' This means that being the dicto entails being temporally dependent, but being temporally dependent does not entail being de dicto. We have seen that beSPEC displays a type of temporal dependence with respect to XP l, namely Tense Harmony. The question is, then, whether beSPEC is also an intensional verb with respect to XP I . If it is, strategy IT should be fo llowed, since strategy IT will derive temporal dependence and intensionality at the same time. If besPEC is not an intensional verb with respect to XP 1, then we should take strategy I, which will derive temporal dependence without intensionality.
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3. The Intensionality of Kn ow+NP and NP+BesPEC.
This section summarizes an argument from Romero (2003) . First, in section 3.1 , it is shown that certain ambiguity observed in Heim (1979) fo r (epistemic) know plus a concealed question (CQ) NP must be derived from the fa ct that, as an intensional verb, know can combine with the NP' s extension or with the NP ' s intension. Section 3.2 then shows that the same ambiguity obtains for the XP 1 of b es PEc and hence extends the proposed intensional analysis to b e s PEc.
1. Ambiguitiesfor Concealed Question NPs with Know.
A Karttun en-style semantics for know with an interrogative CP complement is given in (20)- (22). Karttunen' s (1977) question meaning in (20) combines with the lexical entry fo r know in (2 1 ) (corresponding to Heim' s (1994) strongly exhaustive reading) to yield the truth conditions in (22).
A parsimonious extension of this analysis to know plus CQ would hold the fo llowing tenets. Take the contribution of the NP the capital of Italy in (23) to be the individual concept spelled out in (24). Kn owcQ in (25) is like knowcp in (2 1 ) except that the fo rmer takes as its argument an individual concept -a function fr om worlds to (possibly plural) individuals-and the later takes a question meaning -a function from worlds to sets of propositions. The truth conditions for (23) are given in (26). Roughly, taking Y<se> to stand for t�<s,e>[capital-of-Italy�], (26) says that John knows the capital of Italy at w iff John is at w able to identify the value yew) that y yields when applied to w (see Heim 1979, p. 56) . With this background, we turn now to Heim' s (1979) ambiguity. Heim notes that example (27) is ambiguous between two readings. Reading A, paraphrasable as "John knows the same price as Fred " , is given a scenario in (28). Reading B, paraphrasable as "John knows which price Fred knows " , is exemplified in (29).
(27) John knows the price that Fred Knows.
(28)
There are several relevant questions about prices:
"How much is the milk? " "How much is the oil? " "How much is the ham? " Fred knows the answer to one of these questions, e.g., to the first one. John knows the answer to this question too.
"How much is the milk? " "How much is the oil? " "How much is the ham? " Fred knows the answer to one of these questions, e.g., to "How much is the milk? " . Then, there is the "meta-question " asking which of these questions is the one whose answer Fred knows. John knows the answer to that meta-question. I.e., John knows that the question about prices whose answer Fred knows is "How much is the milk? " .
The question then arises, what the source of this ambiguity is. Two attempts will be made at deriving the ambiguity using exclusively the intensional object denoted by the CQ NP, that it, using exclusively the extension of the CQ NP. Figure (30 ) applies the standard syntax and semantic computation fo r extensions to the NP the price that Fred knows. Based on (30), the first attempt will try to derive the ambiguity from the binding of the world variable w' in the predicates price and know in (30). The second attempt will toy with the semantic type of the trace. Note that, whatever type 0' we decide t/ has, it will carry over to the top of the NP tree in (30): 0' will be the type of the A-abstracted � in the CP denotation (thus, the CP denotes a set of obj ects of type 0'), and 0' will also be the type of the unique obj ect t�(J[ ... ] referred to by the NP (that is, [the]g picks the unique object in [CP]g n [price ]g). Both attempts will be shown to fa il. Once purely extensional analyses have been dismissed, we will turn to the present
TENSE AND INTENSIONALITY IN SPECIFICATIONAL COPULAR SENTENCES
proposal: as an intensional verb, know can combine with the extension or with the intension of its NP complement.
(30) the price that Fred knows
ATTEMPT 1 capitalizes on the world variable of the predicates price and (embedded) know, marked as ?? in (3 1). The question is: can we derive the two readings from the two possibilities ofw-binding in (3 1) Binding by A W produces the truth conditions (32), which correspond to reading A:
(32) Reading A: "John knows the same price that Fred knows. " 
(34) SCENARIO: John correctly thinks that Fred knows how much the milk costs and that Fred knows no other price. But John himself does not know how much the milk costs.
Since (33) does not correspond to reading B and there is no other possible w-binder in the fo rmula to derive this reading, attempt 1 is dismissed.
ATTEMPT 2 manipulates the type of the trace f1 to derive the two readings. The intuition is that, whereas in reading A the matrix subj ect John knows the answer to a simple price question, in reading B he knows the answer to a price "meta-question " . In terms of types, according to reading A John is able to identify the actual value �<s,e>(w) of a given �<s,e>, whereas according to reading B John is able to identify the actual value �<s,se>(w) of a given �<s,se>. Since the (extensional) type of the entire NP stems from the type of the trace f1, attempt 2 capitalizes on the type of the trace.
Taking the type of the trace to be <s,e>, we arrive at the correct truth c Oli ditions fo r reading A in (35). For that, we use the lexical entry fo r know that we already had in (25), repeated here as know1 in (36b), and a parallel lexical entry for price1 in (36a).
(35) Reading A: "John knows the same price that Fred knows. "
If the type of the trace is <s,<s,e» instead, we derive the truth conditions in (37). (37) corresponds (roughly) to reading 802 Note, though, that in order to generate these truth conditions, we need not only the lexical entries price] and knOW] in (3 8) --crosscategorial variants fo r those in (36}-but also the entry know3 in (38c).
[knOW3]g is needed as the meaning of embedded know, so that the embedded subj ect Fred is said to be able to identity the actual value �<s,se> (w)](w) of the simple question �<s,se>(w)]<s,e>, rather than the actual value �<s,se> (w) of the meta-question �<s,se>. The problem with attempt 2 is the fo llowing. Let us concede that we have all the lexical entries listed above. We can combine these lexical entries in several ways. Two possibilities are these:
i Given the lexical entries that we need to generate readings A and B -in particular, given that we need knOW3 in addition to the more standard knOW1 and knowr, there is no way to rule out compositionally the unavailable reading B ' .
Once purely extensional analyses of the NP have been ruled out, ATTEMPT 3 presents my proposal: both the extension and the intension of the NP can provide the semantic argument of know.
An intensional verb like look fo r takes an intensional obj ect as its argument (Zimmermann 1992 , Moltmann 1997, among many others). This intensional object is often provided directly by the intension of its complement NP, as in (42). But this intensional object can also arise from the extension of a higher type NP. This second possibility is illustrated in (43), which has a de dicto reading on the extension of the NP that makes it true in scenario (44):
(42) John is looking for the unicorn with the longest hom.
a. 'In all of John' s bouletic alternatives w ' in w: John finds in w' the Xe that is the unicorn with the longest hom in w' (whichever that may be). '
(43) John is looking fo r the unicorn Fred is looking for (: the one with the longest hom.) a. 'Each x out of John and Fred is such that, in all of x ' s bouletic alternatives w' in w: x finds in w' the individual Xe that is the unicorn with the longest hom in w' (whichever that may be). '
(44) SCENARIO: John does not have any beliefs as to which unicorn has the longest hom. He wants to catch the unicorn with the longest hom, whichever that may be. Exactly the same holds for Fred.
I propose that the choice between the NP' s extension and intension is the source of the ambiguity between reading A and reading B. More concretely, reading A obtains when the NP ' s extension is used, whereas reading B fo llows when know combines with the NP ' s intension. This is sketched in (45) The proposed analysis is spelled out in (46) through (49). Only the lexical entries in (46) are needed (which crucially exclude knOW3). The intension of the NP the price that Fred knows is computed in (47). To obtain reading A, we take the intension built in (47) and we apply it to the actual world Wo to generate the NP' s extension. This extension -which is itself an intensional obj ect of type <s,e>-is then used as the argument of the matrix verb (knOW1). The result is (48),
which truth-conditionally corresponds to reading A. To derive reading B, we take the intension built in (47) and combine it directly with the matrix verb (knOW2). We obtain the truth conditions in (49), which match reading B. -------- In sum, the ambiguity between reading A and B with know derives from the fact that know can take as its semantic argument the extension or the intension of its complement NP, as other intensional verbs can.
Ambiguities fo r NP Subjects of Sp ecificational Be.
Interestingly, note that the same ambiguity fo und with CQ NPs with know is fo und in the XP I subject of besPEc. For example, the NP the price that Fred thought was $1.29 yields reading A in example (50), exemplified in (5 1), and it yields reading B in (52), exemplified in (53).
(50) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 was (actually) $1.79.
(5 1) Reading A: "The question whose answer Fred thought was '$1.29' has as its real answer ' $1.79' . " There are several relevant questions about prices:
"How much is the milk? " "How much is the oil? " "How much is the ham? " For one of these questions, Fred thought the answer was '$1.29' . But the actual answer to that question is '$1.79' .
(52) The price that Fred thought was $1.29 was the price of milk.
(53) Reading B: "The question whose answer Fred thought was '$1 .29' is 'How much is the milk? ' . " There are several relevant questions about prices:
"How much is the milk? " "How much is the oil? " "How much is the ham? " For one of these questions, Fred thought the answer was '$1.29' . Then, there is the "meta-question " asking which of these questions is the one whose answer Fred thought was $1.29. The answer to the meta-question is "How much is the milk? " . That is, Fred thought that the price of milk is $1.29.
Are the sentences (51 ) and (52) specificational as opposed to predicational? That (5 1) is a specificational sentence is hardly arguable: it is like the sentence The price of milk is $1. 79 except for the choice of definite description. As fo r (52), the intended meaning involves a de dicto reading of the post-copular phrase the price of milk under thought. This is an instance of Opacity Connectivity, a trait of specificational but not of predicational sentences, as we saw in section 1. As a further test, take scenario (54) and the sentences (55)- (56), which display Variable Binding Connectivity. (55) illustrates reading A and (56) exemplifies reading B.
(54) SCENARIO fo r (55)- (56): A group of 2-year old girls from the Ukraine was given in adoption to several fa milies in Barcelona. The director of the adoption program encouraged the biological relatives of each girl to keep in touch with her by writing letters, telling them though that they should not identify themselves using their name or fa mily relationship. After a couple of years, the girls have developed some hypotheses on who every secret writer may or may not be. For example, no girl thinks that the one who writes to her the least can possibly be her mother. In fact, they are all right, since, for every girl, the one who writes to her the least is her uncle.
(55) Reading A:
The anonymous writer that no girh thinks can possibly be herl mother is (in fa ct) herl uncle.
(56) Reading B:
The anonymous writer that no girll thinks can possibly be herl mother is the one who writes to herl the least.
I propose to analyze the ambiguity arising for NP subj ects of beSPEC in a way parallel to the ambiguity with NP objects of know. BeSPEC is an intensional verb needing an intensional object as its semantic argument. This intensional object can be drawn from the extension of its NP subject (reading A) or from the NP 's intension (reading B), as summarized in (57). The (crosscategorial) lexical entries for beSPEC are given in (58). From (57)-(58) the truth conditions in (59) and (60) are derived, which correspond to reading A and reading B respectively. To sum up section 3, we have seen that the ambiguity between reading A and B with know + NP cannot be derived using exclusively the extension of the NP. The ambiguity fo llows if, like other intensional verbs, know can draw the intensional obj ect needed as its semantic argument either from the extension (reading A) or from the intension (reading B) of the NP. The same reading A / reading B ambiguity arises fo r NP 1 + beSPEC. I have proposed an analysis parallel to the one fo r know: beSPEC is an intensional verb and can draw the required intensional object from the extension or fr om the intension of the NP. Second, the clusters PA ST-to and PRES-(now) have an argument slot At for a pronominal restrictor, whose function is to delimit the possible range of times t' to a given temporal interval t. The resulting lexical entries are as fo llows: 3
Sharvit ' s (2003) proposes that Tense Harmony arises because the tense operator of the matrix clause binds directly (in strategy n or indirectly (in strategy II) the pronominal restrictor of the embedded tense operator. Direct binding in strategy I produces the LF of sentence (66) in (67a), where the pronominal restrictor tl remains unbound within the NP and is later bound at the matrix level by the index 1 under PAST, hence yielding "direct " binding by PAST. The semantic contribution of the NP is thus (67b). Note that, according to this LF, beSPEC is atemporal (i.e. it has no temporal argument) and it takes two arguments of the same type cr. This is captured in the lexical entry (67c).
(66) What John liked was Wa r and Peace. In contrast, strategy II has the pronominal restrictor t2 A-bound within the NP, as in (68a). The semantic contribution of the NP is thus (68b). Note that this time beSPEC combines with a post-copular argument of type cr and with a pre-copular argument of type <i,<s,cr» . That is, under strategy II, beSPEC is a (temporally) intensional verb with respect to its subj ect position, as defined in (68c). BeSPEC has, furthermore, its own temporal argument tin (68c). This variable t will be A converted into the At2 slot of the NP I function, and it will be bound at the matrix level under PAST, yielding the effect of "indirect " binding of t2 by PAST. We saw in section 2 that there are temporal dependence phenomena which are not related to de dicto readings and which could thus be analyzed in the spirit of strategy I (e.g. bare plural NPs in Spanish). We also saw that de dicto readings enforce temporal dependence. This means that there is no strategy I' -the counterpart of strategy I operating on worlds-deriving world dependence (de dicto readings) and leaving time as possibly independent. Hence, constructions with temporally dependent de dicto readings (e.g. Subjunctive marking in Spanish Res) must be analyzed as having one and the same source for both effects (temporal/world intensionality in strategy II) and not two different sources (strategy I fo r times and the non-attested strategy I' fo r worlds). Given the proposal in section 3 that beSPEC is a (world-)intensional verb, I propose that its temporal dependence -Tense Harmony-be derived using strategy II.
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Adopting strategy II, let us illustrate Sharvit' s idea fo r the fo ur cases in ( configurations grammatical as well. In contrast, case fo ur in (72) leads to inconsistency: it requires fo r there to be a time interval t " (completely) prior to to
